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Do Foreigners Replace Native Immigrants?  
Evidence from a Panel Cointegration Analysis 
 
This paper examines the impact of the immigration of foreigners on domestic labour mobility. 
Since David Card's seminal study on the regional labour market impact of the Mariel Boatlift it 
is controversial whether domestic labour mobility equilibrates economic conditions across 
cities and regions. However, there is little or no evidence that natives leave destinations 
where migrants tend to cluster. In this paper we reconcile the existing evidence by taking 
another route. We analyze whether the immigration of foreigners replaces domestic mobility 
from poor to rich regions. We focus on Italy, which is characterized by market differences in 
earnings between the North and the South. Based on a panel cointegration approach we 
exploit the variance of international and internal migration over time for identifying potential 
displacement effects. The main finding is that, conditional on unemployment and wage 
differentials, the share of foreign workers in the labour force of the destination regions 
discourages internal labour mobility significantly. As a consequence, spatial correlation 
studies which use the variance of the foreigner share across region for identifying the wage 
and employment effects of immigration, tend to understate the actual immigration impact. 
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The objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of
the impact of international migration on domestic labour mobility in the
destination country. We analyze the case of a destination country with a core
and a periphery (two regions with cultural and geographical proximity but
very distant in terms of factor endowment and of specialization patterns).
The aim is to understand the role played by the in￿ ow of foreign migrants
in changing the equilibrium between labour markets in the two areas. The
question we address is whether international migration - while mitigating
an international imbalance - is aggravating a domestic imbalance in the
countries of destination at the same time.
The literature on the e⁄ects of foreign immigration on native wages
and employment opportunities has devoted much attention to the question
whether the arrival of foreign immigrants has induced the out-migration of
natives in the a⁄ected areas. Following David Card￿ s famous analysis of
the impact of the Mariel Boatlift on labour markets in the Miami region
(Card, 1990), a large body of literature has exploited cross-regional di⁄er-
ences in the foreigner share for identifying the e⁄ects of immigration on
wages or other labour market variables. For an overview see Card (2002)
and the references therein. Examples for European studies are Hunt (1992),
Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999), Gavosto, Venturini and Villosio
(1999) Winckelmann and Zimmermann (1993) and Dustmann (2005).2 Most
of these studies ￿nd only weak e⁄ects if at all (see Longhi et al., 2005, 2006,
2008, for a meta-analysis of the literature).
This literature has been challenged by the contributions of Filer (1992),
Borjas (2003) and others, who suggest that the weak labour market e⁄ects
of migration found in studies which use the cross-regional variation in the
foreigner share might be traced back to the fact that natives leave areas
where immigrants concentrate. Hence, the e⁄ects of migration are spread
away to other areas and the impact of an increase in the foreign labour
force in one area is diluted to other parts of the country. Borjas (2003)
therefore proposes to use national data rather than regional data in order
to identify the labour market e⁄ects of migration. Indeed, he ￿nds evidence
for larger e⁄ects of migration in national-level studies than those found in
regional-level studies (Borjas, 2003; Aydemir and Borjas, 2006), although
this evidence is not uncontroversial (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, 2008).
However, as Card and Di Nardo (2000) and Card (2002) have shown, there is
little or no evidence that natives do actually leave areas where international
1Financial support from MIUR is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Monica
Angelillo for skillful and dedicated research assistance and Roberto Quaranta for kindly
providing data from the WHIP database. Correspondance to: Herbert.Bruecker@iab.de,
s.fachin@caspur.it, alessandra.venturini@unito.it.
2For a careful survey of the European empirical results see also Venturini (2004).
1migrants cluster. Hence, there is no evidence which supports the hypothesis
that regional-level studies tend to understate the impact foreign migration
on domestic labour markets due to an out-migration of natives.
We reconcile this contrasting evidence in this paper by taking another
route. Consider the case of a country which is characterized by a core and
a periphery, i.e. by substantial di⁄erences in earnings and employment op-
portunities between the rich and the poor region. Distinguish three types
of workers in the destination region by their migration status: local natives
(born and resident there), immigrant natives (born in another region but
resident in the core) and foreign immigrants. The entry of foreigners may
indeed provide an incentive for natives in the destination region to move to
another region of the core or even abroad if they compete in the labour mar-
ket or other markets such as the housing market. However, since migrants
from foreign countries usually tend to move into prosperous regions of the
destination country, those incentives to leave an area penetrated by foreign
migrants are relatively small. Moreover, foreign workers might be comple-
ments in the labour market for local natives or reduce prices for services and
goods consumed by local natives.
There is however a second channel, by which foreign migration can a⁄ect
the domestic labour supply: the entry of foreigners can replace immigration
of natives from the periphery to the core. The entry of foreign migrants
can hinder the immigration of natives from the periphery to the core by
various channels: falling wages, lower employment opportunities, shortage
of housing, and other e⁄ects which tend to replace domestic migration. Es-
sentially, the negative e⁄ect of foreign immigration on native immigration
can explain the reduction of native labour supply in regions where foreign
migrants concentrate (in short, Borjas￿hypothesis), which is however not in-
duced by out￿ ows of natives from the area of immigration (in short, Card￿ s
hypothesis).
Note that the out-migration of natives to other regions in the core and
the replacement of immigration from the periphery to the core may cause
di⁄erent economic e⁄ects: while the ￿rst phenomenon restores an equilib-
rium between regions of the core after a labour supply shock, the latter
conserves or even worsens imbalances between the periphery and the core.
To identify the di⁄erent e⁄ects of international migration on domestic
labour mobility, we analyze the impact of immigration of foreigners on native
labour mobility. Contrary to the micro literature of the subject (Attanasio
and Padoa Schioppa, 1991; Faini et al., 1997), which examines the e⁄ects
of foreign immigration on the emigration of natives, we analyze here how
foreign labour supply changes a⁄ect labour demand in the core, and, hence,
native migration from the periphery to the core. For this purpose, we iden-
tify the basic channels by which foreign immigration can a⁄ect equilibria
in the core and the periphery of the destination country in a simple labour
market model which considers wage rigidities. Based on this model, we
2try to assess empirically whether the immigration of foreigners does indeed
reduce domestic migration of natives from the periphery to the core.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Italy, which is in our view especially
suitable for four reasons: First, Italy is characterized by marked regional
di⁄erences in employment opportunities and wages between the core in the
North and the periphery in the South. These regional imbalances are one of
the largest within the EU and the OECD. Second, there exists a substantial
amount of previous research which has examined the impact of immigration
of foreigners on native wages (Gavosto et al. 1999) and on the probability
of ￿nding or losing a job (Venturini and Villosio, 2006). These studies have
adopted the spatial correlation approach and ￿nd little or no evidence that
foreign migration a⁄ects wages and employment opportunities of natives.
Third, Italy has become one of the main destinations of immigration in
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, at a foreign population of 2 millions and
a share of foreign workers in the Italian labour force of about 7 % in 2007.
This share is increasing even further, making Italy together with Spain to
one of the main migration destinations in Europe since the beginning of this
century. Fourth, there exist long time-series data on foreign immigration
as well as on domestic migration of natives in Italy, which enables us to
address our empirical question within the framework of advanced time-series
econometrics.
Our sample covers eleven destination regions in the Centre and North
of Italy from 1975 to 2001. The empirical framework which we apply uses
the variance of international and internal migration as well as of other key
explanatory variables over time for identifying the potential replacement ef-
fects of foreign immigration. The variables of interest are very likely to be
non-stationary. Although the econometric analysis of non-stationary vari-
ables is now two decades old and well established in the literature, the
overwhelming share of the labour market literature on the determinants of
migration ignores the time-series properties of the data (e.g. Clark et al.,
2002; Hatton and Tani, 2002; Hatton, 2003; Pederson et al., 2003). Notable
exceptions are the papers by Hatton (1995), Br￿cker and Schr￿der (2006)
and Fachin (2007).
On the contrary, in this paper we fully take into account the stochas-
tic properties of the variables of interest, as well as exploiting the panel
structure of the data set. We take the cross-sectional dependence of the
data into account by applying the cross-sectionally augmented ADF test
proposed by Pesaran (2007) and the bootstrap panel cointegration test sug-
gested by Fachin (2007). Although quite popular, we do not pool the data
in the estimation of the model since pooled estimator are inconsistent if het-
erogeneity is present (see e.g. Pesaran and Smith, 1995). Allowing for full
heterogeneity, we take into account the causal links between the variables of
the model within each regional unit and between units of our panel.
Based on this approach, we ￿nd indeed evidence that foreign immigration
3replaces the internal migration of natives. Our estimation results suggest
that these e⁄ects are signi￿cant and sizeable. Thus, the replacement of
domestic migration is an important issue and has therefore to be considered
in the analysis of the labour market e⁄ects of foreign immigration.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a
simple model, which analyzes the wage and employment e⁄ects of migration
in a core-periphery framework which considers the impact of migration on
domestic labour mobility. Our model suggests not only that the immigra-
tion of foreigners replaces domestic labour mobility. Moreover, if domestic
migration is indeed replaced by international migrants, the regional impact
of foreign migration is mitigated such that regional-level studies ￿nd small
or even no migration e⁄ects, even if they exist at the national level. Sec-
tion 3 presents the data and Section 4 the empirical framework and and the
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The impact of migration on labour supply
Consider a country which comprises two regions, North and South. Labour is
homogeneous, such that migrant and native workers are perfect substitutes.
Wages and employment opportunities are better in the North, i.e. wd > wh,
and ud < uh, where w denotes the wage rate, u the unemployment rate, and
the subscript d the North (i.e. the destination region) and the subscript h
the South (i.e. the home region of South-North migrants). Migrants move
to region which is characterized by higher wages and better employment
opportunities, i.e. the North.
The labour supply in the North is given by
Sd = Nd + Md + Fd; (1)
where Sd denotes the total labour force in the North, Nd the labor force of
local residents, Md the labour force from the South residing in the North, and
Fd the foreign labour force residing in the North. International migration is
treated here as an exogenous shock. The labour supply of natives from the
North is determined by the domestic migration equation
Nd = a1(lnwd ￿ lnwh) ￿ a2(lnud ￿ lnuh) ￿ a3Fd + ￿0zd; (2)
where the vector zd denotes all location speci￿c factors which in￿ uence
domestic migration decisions of natives in the North such as a familiar envi-
ronment and social relations, and ￿ the respective vector of coe¢ cients. The
third term on the right hand side captures all factors by which the presence
4of foreigners a⁄ect the utility of natives beyond wages and employment op-
portunities. This covers factors such as housing, congestion, criminality or
simply xenophobia.
Analogously, the labour supply from the South in the North is repre-
sented by the migration equation
Md = b1(lnwd ￿ lnwh) ￿ b2(lnud ￿ lnuh) ￿ b3Fd + ￿0zd: (3)
Equation (2) captures the traditional Borjas-Filer argument, although it
has proven to be rather weak empirically according to the evidence provided
by David Card. This is hardly surprising, since migrants tend to concentrate
in prosperous regions, where the incentives for natives to leave are low. In
contrast, equation (3) represents the argument which we will examine in this
paper, i.e. that foreign migrants tend to replace the immigration of natives
from other regions. However, the implications of pushing natives in away
from the prosperous regions or replacing the immigration of natives from
other regions are identical for the labour market, as is demonstrated in the
next subsection.
2.2 The labour market impact
The marginal response of the labour supply in the North with respect to a









￿ (1 ￿ ￿3); (4)
where we use ￿1 = a1 + b1, ￿2 = a2 + b2, and ￿3 = a3 + b3, for convenience.
Note that Equation (4) implies that we ignore the indirect e⁄ects of migra-
tion into the North on wages and employment opportunities in the South.
This can be justi￿ed by the assumption that migration is small or that the
North is a small region relative to the South.
For the analysis of the wage and employment impact of migration it
is necessary to make assumptions on the wage setting mechanism. We as-
sume here that wages are ￿xed by a bilateral bargaining monopoly between
trade unions and employer federations. The employer hires workers until
the wage equals the marginal productivity of labour when the wage is ￿xed
(￿ right-to-manage￿ ). This is known by the participants in the wage negotia-
tions. The participants consider the impact of wages on (un-)employment,
albeit imperfectly. This allows writing the wage rate as a function of the
unemployment rate, i.e. as
wd = ￿(ud); (5)
where ￿0 < 0 and the unemployment rate is de￿ned as




5We assume furthermore that the aggregate production function of the
region is characterized by constant returns to scale and homogeneous of
degree 1. In the short term, the capital stock is ￿xed. This enables us to
derive the implicit function
￿(Ld;Sd) ￿ wd(Ld) ￿ ￿(ud(Ld;Sd)) = 0; (6)
where the wage rate wd equals the marginal product of labour and ￿ is by
the de￿nition of the unemployment rate a function of Ld and Sd.
For convenience, we write in the following the elasticity of the wage rate
with respect to labour as ￿ and the semi-elasticity of the wage with respect to
unemployment as ￿ = ￿￿0=wd. Di⁄erentiating equation (6) implicitly yields
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[￿(1 ￿ ud) ￿ ￿]Sd ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ud)[￿1￿ + ￿2=ud]
: (7)





￿(1 ￿ ud) ￿ ￿
if migration does not a⁄ect internal labour mobility, i.e. if ￿i = 0,8 i, and i
2 f1;2;3g. Thus, the impact of migration on the growth of employment is
smaller if migration has no impact on domestic labour mobility (note that
￿ is negative).
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Finally, the impact of immigration on the unemployment rate in the
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6in case of no domestic labour mobility. Note again that ￿ is negative such
that an increase in labour supply through immigration increases unemploy-
ment in the destination region. Nevertheless, internal labour mobility dilutes
the e⁄ects of immigration on unemployment in the destination region.
2.3 Transfers to the South
In Italy migration incentives are diminished by substantial ￿scal transfers
from the wealthy North to the less prosperous South. Assume for the sake
of convenience that transfers are ￿nanced by a proportional tax on labour
income and take the form of direct payments. We can then rewrite equations
(2) and (3) as
Nd = a1 ln((1 ￿ ￿)wd) ￿ ln((1 ￿ ￿)wh) ￿ a2(lnud ￿ lnuh)
￿ a3Fd + a4 ln￿h + ￿0zd (10)
and
Md = b1 ln((1 ￿ ￿)wd) ￿ ln((1 ￿ ￿)wh) ￿ b2(lnud ￿ lnuh)
￿ b3Fd + b4 ln￿h + ￿0zd (11)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 denotes the proportional tax on labour income and ￿h > 0
the transfer payment per capita which each member of the labour force
receives in the South. Note that ￿h = ￿ [wd(1 ￿ ud)sd + wh(1 ￿ uh)], where
sd denotes the ratio of the labour force in the North to the labour force in
the South, i.e. sd = Sd=Sh. Fiscal transfers thus reduce the incentives for
natives from the South to move to the North, while it increases the incentives
for natives from the North to move to the South.
2.4 Speci￿cation of the empirical model
Consider the partial adjustment mechanism ￿Mdh;t = ￿(M￿
dh;t ￿ Mdh;t￿1),
where M￿
dh;t is the long-run equilibrium stock of natives natives from the
home region h at destination d as given by equation (3), and the parameter
￿ (0 < ￿ < 1) determines the speed of adjustment. If we normalize the
migration stock by the labour force in the destination region and by adding
an error term yields the estimation equation
mdht = ￿0 + ￿1(lnwdt ￿ lnwht) + ￿2(lnudt ￿ lnuht) + ￿3fdt + ￿4 ln￿ht
+ ￿5mstdh;t￿1 + "dht; (12)
where the migration rate mdht is de￿ned here as ￿Mdht=Sdt, fdt as Fdt=Sdt
and mstdh;t￿1 as the normalized lagged migration stock, i.e. as Mdh;t￿1=Sd;t￿1.
￿0 denotes the constant, ￿i(i 2 1;2:::5) the coe¢ cients for the explanatory
variables, and "dht the error term. Note that we have assumed that the
7(net) migration in￿ ow equals the change in the migration stock, i.e. we
have ignored di⁄erences in the natural rate of population growth between
natives from the South residing in the North and the native population in
the South.
Following our theoretical considerations, we expect that ￿1 > 0, ￿2 <
0, ￿3 < 0, ￿4 < 0 and ￿5 < 0. The negative coe¢ cient for the lagged
migration stock follows from the partial adjustment mechanism, i.e. from
the assumption that ￿ > 0. However, network e⁄ects or chain migration
e⁄ects which tend to reduce information and search costs as well as the costs
of living in an unfamiliar environment, are positively correlated with lagged
migration stocks. Thus, the impact of the lagged migration stock on the
migration rate might be ambiguous. We assume here nevertheless that the
negative e⁄ect of the lagged migration stock dominates the positive impact
of network and chain e⁄ects at least in the long-run, since any dynamic
migration model would result in the total emigration of the population from
sending regions if otherwise.
The analysis of domestic migration is hindered by serious data problems.
Data on migration stocks of natives residing in other regions are usually not
available, nor are return migration rates. Our analysis relies therefore on
variables which are in our view good proxies for the variables of the model
in equation (12). We approximate therefore the change in migration stocks
(i.e. the net migration rate) by the gross migration rate, which is closely
correlated to the net migration rate. Moreover, we furthermore approximate
the lagged migration stock by the cumulative gross migration rate (hereafter
in short ￿ migration chain￿ ) during the last three years. The model that we
estimate here is thus similar but di⁄erent to the traditional Borjas-Card-
Filer (alphabetic order adopted) approach, which assumes that natives in
destination countries react to foreign immigration. We do not deny the pos-
sible e⁄ect of foreign immigration on the mobility of the natives. However,
since the evidence that natives are pushed away from prosperous regions
in the core where foreign migrants tend to concentrate is rather weak, we
focus here on the e⁄ect of foreign immigrants on native immigration from
the periphery.
3 International immigration and internal migra-
tion in Italy
Although Italy￿ s long tradition of international and internal migration is well
known,3 its recent experience of massive immigration is much less studied.
3Both Northern and Southern Italy were origin of important migration ￿ ows to North-
ern and Southern America and Northern Europe from the end of the 19th century until
the 1960s. During the 1960s and the 1970s, internal migration from the largely rural South
to the industrialized North-West Italy and Rome (which is in the Center of the country)
8Figure 1: Residence permits in Italy, 1975-2001 (thousands) Notes: Data
before 1992 refer to gross permits (incl. expired permits). Source: Ministry
of the Interior.
Migrants started to choose Italy as a destination country by the end of the
1970s. These early ￿ ows originated mainly in the Mediterranean Northern
African countries (Morocco, Tunisia), the former Italian East Africa colonies
(Ethiopia and Eritrea) and the Philippines. These in￿ ows, and, as a conse-
quence, the stocks of foreign workers, became increasingly important in the
following decades (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Migration to Italy was further
boosted by the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe. Since the beginning of the 1990s, large immigration ￿ ows stem from
countries such as Albania, Romania and Moldova (very close respectively in
geographical and language terms), but Poland and Ukraine (de￿nitely more
distant according to either measure) have also sent a considerable number
of migrants.
The overwhelming share of foreign workers holds unskilled positions (men
typically in the construction and in the industrial sector, while women in
the service sector or as housekeepers and babysitters) (Eurostat 2008). Im-
migrants entered the country often illegally and obtained regular residence
permits later on as a result of one of the many amnesties granted by the
Italian Government during the period considered in this study. Since one of
the conditions to qualify for a residence permit is to hold a regular job, many
of the immigrants entered the country illegally crossing the Mediterranean
was also massive. For a survey see Del Boca and Venturini (2005).
9from the Northern African coasts to the close Southern Italian regions4, and
then moved to the more industrialized regions in the North of Italy. Ac-
cording to the 2001 Population Census, 61.8% of the foreign nationals in
Italy reside in the North, 25% in the Center, and only 13.2% in the South.
As mentioned already, internal migration in Italy has typically been taking
place from the depressed South to the more advanced part of the country,
the Centre-North. In our empirical analysis we shall thus concentrate on
this part of the country, dividing it into 11 regions: ten NUTS 2 areas (re-
gioni, hereafter regions) plus the aggregate of the two neighbouring NUTS
2 regions Piedmont and Val d￿ Aosta. The latter, though a NUTS 2 area,
with less than 61.000 residents according to the 2001 Population Census is
far too small to be the object of an independent robust empirical analysis.
For descriptive purposes we will sometimes cluster these regions in three or
four groups:
1. North-West (NW): Piedmont-Val d￿ Aosta, Liguria and Lombardia.
2. North-East (NE): Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto
and Emilia-Romagna. According to the di⁄erent geographical char-
acteristics, which induce a di⁄erent urban structure, we can further
distinguish the ￿rst two (hereafter North-East/Alps), which include
mostly mountain areas, from the remaining (hereafter North-East/Po,
as they lie in the Po river valley), which include mostly plains.
3. Center: Umbria, Marche, Tuscany and Lazio.
The total stocks of the residency permits granted to males in the 20-
64 cohort in these 11 regions of Central-Northern Italy are plotted in Fig.
2. Note that these series are gross of expired permits until 1991 and net
afterwards: this causes some large breaks in 1992. As we can see, taking
into account this change in de￿nition5 the trends are all largely positive.
At the end of the 1990￿ s the largest stocks of foreign workers in proportion
of the labour force was found in the North-East/Alps (almost 14%; see
Table 1). The presence is more limited in the Center (7%), North-West
(5%) and North-East/Po (3%). On the contrary, immigration ￿ ows from
the South6 have declined since the mid-1990s in all destination regions with
the exception of the Center, where they increased marginally. The fall is
particularly noticeable in the North-East, where it followed a comparably
large hump in the ￿rst half of the 1990￿ s.
4Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.
5In the modelling section we shall correct the variable for this break with a non para-
metric smoothing procedure (more details are given in the Data Appendix). Here we
preferred to use the raw data.
6Separate analyses for di⁄erent parts of the South, e.g. South-East and South-West,
are left to future research.
10Figure 2: Residence permits in Italian Central-Northern regions as a share
of the labour force (logarithmic scale), 1975-2001 Notes: Data before 1992
include expired permits. Source: Ministry of the Interior and Istat (left to
right and top to bottom: Piedmont and Val d￿ Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-
Alto Adige; Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria; Emilia-Romagna, Tus-
cany, Umbria; Marche, Lazio)
11As Table 2 shows, di⁄erences in unemployment rates between the South
and the Northern and ￿to a lesser extent ￿the Central regions are more
likely to explain internal migration incentives than wage di⁄erences, which
have been very small during the entire sample period. In fact, in the main
destination area, the North-Eastern/Alp regions, the wage rate was generally
close to, or even slightly smaller than, that of the Southern regions. Con-
versely, since the mid-1980s the low or moderate unemployment rates in the
Center-North have been in striking contrast with the mass unemployment
in the South. Within the destination areas there have been some signi￿cant
di⁄erentials, though: the North West, traditionally the most developed area
of the country, experienced a rather long stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s.
As a consequence, its unemployment rate has been a few points higher there
than that in the North East where it has declined steadily since the mid
1980s. In the Center regions, labour market conditions have been always
distinctly worse than that in all Northern areas, though obviously still much
better than in the South during the period of interest.
Table 1
Foreign and native immigration in the
regions of Central and Northern Italy, 1975-2001
NW NE/Po NE/Alps Center
Stock of foreign residents
(% of the labour force)
1975 ￿ 1980 1:0 0:5 2:5 1:9
1981 ￿ 1985 1:4 0:7 3:4 2:9
1986 ￿ 1990 1:8 1:1 5:1 4:5
1991 ￿ 1995 2:8 1:7 7:5 5:2
1996 ￿ 2001 5:2 3:1 13:7 7:3
Immigration ￿ows from Southern regions
(% of the labour force)
1975 ￿ 1980 1:8 2:8 7:9 10:0
1981 ￿ 1985 2:5 2:0 12:0 2:3
1986 ￿ 1990 2:8 3:1 8:7 4:1
1991 ￿ 1995 2:3 4:0 20:0 4:2
1996 ￿ 2001 1:6 1:4 6:2 5:2
Foreign residents: total;
Native immigration ￿ows: males, 20-64;
Southern regions: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania,
Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia.
Data sources: Ministry of the Interior and Istat.
12Table 2
Unemployment and wages in Italy, 1975-2001
NW NE/Po NE/Alps Center South
Unemployment rate (%)
1975 ￿ 1980 4:1 4:4 3:3 6:2 8:8
1981 ￿ 1985 6:7 7:2 6:4 8:6 13:5
1986 ￿ 1990 7:6 7:2 7:3 9:9 19:4
1991 ￿ 1995 6:2 5:3 5:2 9:5 19:4
1996 ￿ 2001 6:3 4:8 4:7 9:2 21:2
Annual wage (Lira, million )
1975 ￿ 1980 6:7 6:4 6:2 6:6 6:5
1981 ￿ 1985 15:9 15:4 15:0 15:9 15:3
1986 ￿ 1990 25:2 24:3 23:7 25:0 23:8
1991 ￿ 1995 35:0 33:9 33:1 34:9 33:0
1996 ￿ 2001 40:2 38:7 38:1 39:3 36:4
Wage: 1936.72 Lire = 1 Euro.
Data sources: Istat and National Social Security
Institute (INPS).
4 Empirical method and estimation
4.1 Outline of the testing and estimation strategy
As already discussed above, the key point to be taken in to account in
the speci￿cation of the empirical model is that the variables involved are
very likely to be non-stationary. In order this issue we have to (i) examine
carefully the stochastic properties of variables of interest, (ii) test for the
existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship (or cointegrating relation-
ship) between them, and, if this relationship holds, (iii) estimate the model
by using some suitable method. Let us discuss these three points in turn.
First, testing for non-stationarity and for cointegration (i ￿ ii) requires
special care, as both unit-root and cointegration tests are well known to
have low power in samples as small as ours (26 observations). Hence, we
may fail to detect an existing equilibrium relationship simply because of
insu¢ cient information. Fortunately, our data can be naturally seen as a
panel, where the units are the di⁄erent destinations. Exploiting this feature
we will be able to run testing procedures more powerful than traditional
time series ones. However, these panel tests also have to be chosen carefully
because our units are dependent7. This feature is not admitted by most
of the panel tests available, such as the IPS test (Im, Pesaran and Shin,
7In fact, perfectly dependent in the case of the cointegration tests, since the home
consumption variable is the same for all units.
132003) often used in applied work. We will thus use the cross-sectionally
augmented ADF panel unit root test (CIPS) proposed by Pesaran (2007)
and the bootstrap panel cointegration test developed by Fachin (2007), both
robust to dependence and able to deliver good small sample results.
Second, we have to consider several aspects in the estimation of the
model. A ￿rst point is the pooling issue. Seeing the data as a non-stationary
panel we may either allow for full heterogeneity and, hence, estimate sepa-
rate equations for each destination, or impose homogeneity by pooling the
data. The latter option, through empirically popular, is potentially trouble-
some, as pooled estimators are not consistent under heterogeneity (for the
OLS case, see Pesaran and Smith, 1995). We excluded this option, since it is
estremely unlikely that the slope coe¢ cients are the same for all destination
regions.
Allowing for full heterogeneity, the complete Data Generating Process
(DGP) has one equation for each variable (dependent and explanatory) in
each unit of our panel set-up. We thus have to take into account the structure
of the links both between variables within each unit and between units.
The former is particularly important, as there are two potential causes of
endogeneity of the right-hand side variable:
(i) innovations of the dependent variable Granger-causing those of the
right-hand side variables;
(ii) the long-run disequilibrium in the dependent variable entering the DGP
of the right-hand side variable.
In our case both e⁄ects are especially plausible for the share of foreign
workers in the Center-North. On one hand, this variable may receive a pos-
itive (negative) shock from a negative (positive) internal migration shock.
On the other, deviations of the share of migrants from the South from its
long-run equilibrium level can a⁄ect foreign immigration (e.g., foreign im-
migration may be fostered by insu¢ cient internal mobility).
Endogeneity of type (i) has serious e⁄ects on the properties of standard
OLS estimators, but it is not an issue for more general estimators such as
the FM-OLS estimator (Phillips and Hansen, 1990). It is more complex
to address deviations of the internal immigration variable from its long-run
eequilibrium. If the disequilibrium in the dependent variable enters the DGP
of one of the explanatory variables this variable is not weakly exogenous any
more, and asymptotic inference on single-equation estimators is not valid.
As a consequence, full-information system estimation is required (e.g., the
FIML estimator which has been developed by Groen and Kleibergen, 2003,
for a panel set-up). Unfortunately this is not feasible here given the small
time dimension of our sample. Hence, we proceed with limited-information
estimation of the conditional equations relating internal migration to the set
14of explanatory variables discussed previously and test whether the foreign
immigration variable is weakly exogenous in the long-run.
The second category of cross-equation links mentioned above is between
units, which in our case are the di⁄erent destination regions. The problem
we have to address here is that the shocks of equations for di⁄erent des-
tinations are very likely to be correlated, which in principle would call for
SUR estimation to increase e¢ ciency. In practice, this is not advisable in
case of our data: since the time dimension of our sample is only marginally
larger than the cross-sectional dimension, the estimates of the long-run co-
variance matrix will be of very poor quality or even impossible to obtain
(Pedroni, 1997, Di Iorio and Fachin, 2008). We apply therefore a standard
single-equation method.
Summing up, assuming that Pesaran￿ s CIPS test will prove that our data
are non-stationary, our further empirical analysis will follow an iterative two-
step procedure:
Step A - Panel Cointegration test: First, we compute the ADF cointegration
test statistic for equation (12) in each single destination; second, we
carry out the bootstrap panel cointegration tests proposed by Fachin
(2007) based on the mean and median of these ADF statistics.
Step B - Estimation: We estimate equations (12) by FM-OLS thereby testing
the share of foreign workers for weak exogeneity.
If the estimation results under step B suggest that some coe¢ cient should
be constrained to zero step A is repeated on the constrained speci￿cation of
the model, until a satisfactory speci￿cation is achieved.
4.2 Testing for non-stationarity
Let us now start the empirical analysis by examining the stochastic proper-
ties of our variables. The null hypothesis is that all variables of the model
are characterized by a single unit-root except the share of foreign workers in
the labour force of the destination region. The latter variable, being a func-
tion of the sum of past net immigration ￿ ows, is expected to be integrated
of second order. For this series we thus start testing the null hypothesis of
I(2)-ness following Dickey and Pantula (1987).
Log wage and unemployment di⁄erentials are trend stationary if either
(i) the two series involved are trend stationary (TS) with di⁄erent slopes,
or (i) they are cointegrated with a unit coe¢ cient and have di⁄erent drift
terms. Hence, in these cases the order of the deterministic kernel has been
determined by Ayat and Burridge￿ s (2000) sequential procedure, which im-
plies that we include a trend whenever signi￿cant. In all migration variables
the trend was excluded a priori.
15Let us ￿rst discuss the results of the tests of H0 : I(1) hypothesis, namely
those for the log unemployment and wage di⁄erentials, the migration chain
(past migration - Pm) and the native migration ￿ ows divided by the desti-
nation labour force. The migration chain is measured by the sum of the total
(male and female) ￿ ows of the previous three years divided by the current
labour force.
Overall, the results of the ADF tests (reported in Table 3) for the log un-
employment and wage di⁄erentials are largely in favour of the hypothesis of
di⁄erence stationarity. At the 1% level this is rejected in favour of the trend
stationarity alternative only in the case of the log unemployment di⁄erential
in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and the log wage di⁄erential in Umbria and Lazio;
in a couple of more cases it is rejected at the 5% level, mostly in favour of
the TS alternative. The migration chain variable appears largely di⁄erence-
stationary for the northern regions but strongly stationary in those of the
Center. Finally, the internal migration rate is mostly, but not always, di⁄er-
ence stationary. The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative
of stationarity (without a deterministic trend) in the case of Lombardia and
Trentino-Alto Adige. Looking at the plots (Fig. 3) the outcome for these two
regions appears puzzling; it is probably determined by a pattern followed in
only a part of the time sample.
Finally, according to our individual tests the share of foreigners in the
labour force is mostly I(2), but this ￿nding is reverted by the CIPS panel
test, which rejects the null hypothesis. This happens also for the log wage
di⁄erential, where the mean ADF is heavily in￿ uenced by few large val-
ues (especially Lazio), and the migration chain variable, which is strongly
stationary in the four Central regions.
16Table 3
Unit Roots Tests, 1975 ￿ 2001
ADF
ud wd f Pm m
Piemonte-Val d￿ Aosta ￿3:77T￿￿ ￿2:09T ￿2:78￿ ￿2:57 ￿2:44
Lombardia ￿3:42T￿ ￿2:92T ￿1:31 ￿2:54 ￿3:44￿￿
Trentino-Alto Adige ￿0:72C ￿0:06T ￿3:42￿￿ ￿2:53 ￿3:12￿￿
Veneto ￿2:82T ￿0:53T ￿1:59 ￿2:14 ￿1:92
Friuli-Venezia Giulia ￿5:46T￿￿￿ ￿2:11T ￿2:12 ￿2:12 ￿1:99
Liguria ￿0:80C ￿3:66C￿￿ ￿2:23 ￿2:45 ￿0:32
Emilia-Romagna ￿2:56T ￿2:98T ￿2:21 ￿2:76 ￿0:25
Toscana ￿2:31T ￿0:26T ￿2:48 ￿3:78￿￿￿ ￿3:82￿￿￿
Umbria ￿2:02T ￿4:45T￿￿￿ ￿3:35￿￿ ￿4:47￿￿￿ ￿1:33
Marche ￿2:58T ￿2:93T ￿1:52 ￿3:67￿￿ ￿0:04
Lazio ￿2:77C ￿8:20T￿￿￿ ￿1:69 ￿3:49￿￿ ￿2:79￿
CIPS
with constant ￿2:19 ￿3:16￿￿￿ ￿2:29￿ 2:85￿￿￿ ￿0:90
with constant and trend ￿2:93￿￿ ￿3:31￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
ud : log unemployment di⁄erential; H0 : I(1);
wd : log wage di⁄erential; H0 : I(1);
f : log share of foreign workers on labour force of destination area; H0 : I(2);
Pm : migration chain; H0 : I(1);
m: log share of native immigrants from the South in the destination labour
force; H0 : I(1);
C: Constant included, T : Constant and Trend included,
(trend never included for f;c and m);
CIPS: Pesaran (2007)
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿: signi￿cant at 10%;5%;1%;
Lag selection: 10% t-test on coe¢ cient of last lag, max lag = 3.
174.3 Cointegration: Estimation and Testing
Given the somewhat contradictory results of the unit-root tests presented
in the previous section we decided not to drop any variable in the ￿rst es-
timation step. Instead we start with the full speci￿cation (12) and use the
￿ndings obtained there as a priori in the model selection phase. In view
the small time dimension of the sample we have to be especially careful
here: although the cointegrating coe¢ cients of unrelated variables eventu-
ally converge to zero, in small samples they can be very far from it. Hence,
redundant variables may obscure existing cointegrating relationships8. The
solution suggested by Fachin (2007) is to select the ￿nal speci￿cations from
general ones excluding variables with very small or wrongly signed coe¢ -
cients, which may suggest spurious relations. A fall in the p-value of the
(no) cointegration statistic will con￿rm that these variables have indeed to
be excluded.
Let us now move to the cointegration test results. The panel cointegra-
tion tests with the fully heterogenous speci￿cation (￿xed e⁄ects and het-
erogenous slopes) are reported in Table 4A, along with the p-values of three
versions of bootstrap tests results: the simple and corrected p￿values using
the Davidson and MacKinnon￿ s (2000) Fast Double Bootstrap Type 1 and
Type 2 test (the latter reliable only if consistent with the former). The
bootstrap algorithm used 1000 redrawings and a block length ￿xed at 4.
Note that some experiments show that the results are rather robust to the
choice of the latter within a reasonable range. The FM-OLS estimation re-
sults of the individual equations, individual cointegration test and the t-test
for long-run weak exogeneity of the share of foreign workers are reported in
Table 4B.
As to be expected in view of the small sample size, no individual coin-
tegration statistcs (Z￿, last column) is signi￿cant. The average of the in-
dividual ADF cointegration statistics is not signi￿cant either (the Group
t￿statistic is -3.8, with the various bootstrap p￿values between 32% and
43%). However, the median of the test statistics is closer to the critical
region: the value is -4.6, with p￿values between 9% and 15%. In both cases
the Fast Double Bootstrap p￿values are alweays reasonably close to each
other and to those delivered by the standard bootstrap, suggesting that
the latter is reliable. As also to be expected, many coe¢ cients are small
compared to their estimated variance or have wrong signs. In particular,
the share of foreign workers in the labour force has the expected negative
impact and well-de￿ned coe¢ cients in six cases. In the remaining ￿ve equa-
tions the coe¢ cient is instead positive, a hardly meaningful result. In two
cases (Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) the coe¢ cients are
8Let yt = ￿xt + "t be a cointegrating relationship, so that "t is stationary. Consider
the model yt = bxt + gzt + et; where z is an unrelated I(1) variable. It is immediate to
see that et = "t ￿ gzt; which is I(1) if g 6= 0:
18not signi￿cant, so the variable may be simply dropped from the speci￿ca-
tion. In the remaining three they are signi￿cant, so that we apparently have
a problem. Before proceeding any further we should however recall that, as
discussed above, it is important to check whether the share of foreign work-
ers is weakly exogenous in the long-run: if this is not the case the estimates
are biased and the t-statistics follows a skewed and non-central distribution.
As a consequence, the signi￿cance tests will be biased against the null hy-
pothesis (Boswijk, 1995). In other words, if the share of foreign workers si
not weakly exogenous the coe¢ cients may be spuriously signi￿cant. Follow-
ing Boswijk (1992) we test weak exogeneity computing a signi￿cance test
for the residuals of the cointegrating equations in a marginal model of the
variable of interest, the log di⁄erence of the share of foreign workers. The
test results are reported in column Wf of Table 4B. We can ￿rst of all see
that when the coe¢ cient has the expcted negative sign the test is, often
largely, in favour of the hypothesis of long-run weak exogeneity; hence, in
these cases we can con￿dently state that the relationship is not spurious.
On the contrary, in all cases but one (Marche) where a positive coe¢ cient
was found the test is signi￿cant. Hence, these positive relationships are very
likely to be spurious, and the variable safely excluded. Since in the single
case of Marche it is likely to be acting as a proxy we excluded the variable
from this equation as well.
The results of this speci￿cation search (Table 5A) are striking: all panel
cointegration p-values are now close to, or even smaller than 1%. The plots
of the series and the FM-OLS estimates (Fig. 3) show that the models
manage to capture the main trends as well as some local swings, both in
the case of positive and negative trends. As expcted, an increase of the
unemployment rate in the destination area, for a given level in the area of
origin, discourages emigration. On the opposite, an increasing wage di⁄eren-
tial pushes emigration with very high coe¢ cients especially in the dynamic
North-Eastern regions of Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia: a
1% increases in wage di⁄erential increases the immigration by at least 5%.
The per capita consumption, which acts as a proxy of transfers, when in-
cluded has always the expected negative sign, with coe¢ cients very similar
across destinations. Past emigration discourages new in￿ ows.
The foreigner share (for which the long-run weak exogeneity hypothesis
is now always largely accepted: see column Wf in Table 5B) appears to have
a negative e⁄ect on internal migration in the North-West (Piedmont-Val
d￿ Aosta, Liguria and Lombardia) and in two of the four regions of the Center
(Toscana and Lazio). No e⁄ect, on the other hand, is found in any of the
fast-growing regions of the North-East. Altogether, we can conclude that,
conditional on unemployment and wage di⁄erences, the share of foreigners
matters: the higher it is, the smaller the native immigration ￿ ows relative
to the destination labour force.
The picture that emerges is very clear. Foreign migrants increase the
19opportunity cost of moving to the former destination areas, North West
(Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria) and Tuscany, while do not play a signi￿-
cant role in the more recent destination area the North East and this rise
the question of the direction of the causality. Do employers hire foreign-
ers because internal migrants do not move anymore to the North West, or,
rather, internal migrants stopped going to the North West because the for-
eign migrants reduced their job options? Since the cointegrating equation
(12) describes an equilibrium, it is compatible with causality between the
share of foreign workers and internal migration running in both directions:
from the former to the latter, as assumed in our analysis, or vice versa.9
Keeping all possible caveats on the elusiveness of the concept of causal-
ity in mind, we can tackle the issue using the concept of Granger causality.
Following Granger (1988), we estimate an error correction model (ECM) ex-
plaining the growth in the share of foreign workers with the lagged growth
of all the other right-hand side variables of the model (12) and the lagged
disequilibrium of internal migration:
￿fdt = ￿0 + ￿1(￿wdt￿1 ￿ ￿wht￿1) + ￿2(￿udt￿1 ￿ ￿uht￿1) + ￿3￿mdht￿1 +
￿4￿cht￿1 + ￿5￿mstdh;t￿2 + ￿6ECMt￿1 + ￿dht (13)
where
ECMt = mdht￿￿0￿￿1(wdt￿wht)￿￿2(udt￿uht)￿￿3fdt￿￿4cht￿￿5mstdh;t￿1:
The hypothesis that internal migration does not Granger cause the share
of foreign workers conditional on the information set of equation (12) can
be expressed as H0:￿3 = ￿6 = 0. If this hypothesis holds neither the lagged
growth nor lagged level (embedded in the ECM) of internal migration play
any role in determining the current growth of the share of foreign workers.
As we can see from the column GNC in Table 5B the p-values of this
hypothesis are all very large (the smallest is 0.55): we can thus safely exclude
an inverse causal link running from internal migration to the share of foreign
workers.
Table 4A
Long-run trends in native immigration in the
Central-Northern Italian regions from South Italy, 1978-2001
Panel Cointegration Tests - Unrestricted models
Bootstrap p-values ￿100
simple FDB1 FDB2
Group t ￿3:79 32:4 46:1 43:5
Median t ￿4:58 8:8 15:4 12:3
Model: equation (12);
Bootstrap: 1000 redrawings, block length: 4;
FDB: Fast Double Bootstrap, type 1 and 2.
9Clearly, for cointegration to hold, one of the two causality links must exist.
20Table 4B
Long-run trends in native immigration in the
Central-Northern Italian regions from South Italy, 1978-2001
FM-OLS estimates - Unrestricted models






































































































































































Dependent variable: immigrants from South Italy/destination labour force (log);
￿ : constant;
ud : log unemployment di⁄erential (destination-home);
wd : log wage di⁄erential (destination-home);
f : share of foreigners on labour force of destination area (log);
Pm : past migration;
ch : home per capita household consumption (log, 1995 prices);
t￿statistics: in brackets;




Long-run trends in native immigration in the
Central-Northern Italian regions from South Italy, 1978-2001
Panel Cointegration Tests - Restricted models
Bootstrap p-values ￿100
simple FDB1 FDB2
Group t ￿3:41 0:7 1:3 1:3
Median t ￿4:38 0:5 1:1 0:8
Model: equation (12) with zero restrictions (see
Table 5B);
Bootstrap: 1000 redrawings, block length: 4;
FDB: Fast Double Bootstrap, type 1 and 2.
Table 5B
Long-run trends in native immigration in the
Central-Northern Italian regions from South Italy, 1978-2001
FM-OLS estimates - Restricted models














































































































Dependent variable: immigrants from South Italy/destination labour force (log);
GNC : F-test of H0 : internal migrations do not Granger cause f; p-value in brackets;
all other de￿nitions and abbreviations: see table 4B
22Figure 3: Native immigrants from South Italy on labour force (logs, solid
line) and FM-OLS estimates (dashed line), 1978-2001. Left to right and
top to bottom: Piemonte and Val d￿ Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige;
Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria; Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria;
Marche, Lazio.
235 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered three channels by which the immigration
of foreigners can a⁄ect the internal migration of natives in Italy: First,
by reducing the wage di⁄erence between the destination and the sending
region, second, by reducing the di⁄erence in employment opportunities in the
destination and sending regions, and, third, directly by a⁄ecting the utility of
natives. Note that the share of foreigners a⁄ects utility in several ways, e.g.
through housing prices, congestion, criminality or simply xenophobia. Our
estimation results suggest that all three channels matter: Internal migration
of natives from the South to the North in Italy is driven both by economic
factors such as wage and unemployment di⁄erences as well as by the foreigner
share in the destination region. Moreover, we ￿nd evidence that the foreigner
share in the destination region Granger causes internal migration rather than
the other way round.
Thus, the traditional empirical literature (e.g. Hatton and Tani, 2005)
which focusses on the emigration of natives from the destination region may
miss the key point how immigration of foreigners a⁄ect domestic labour
supply in the destination region. Considering all three groups ￿foreigners,
natives at the destination and natives in other regions ￿may thus contribute
to a better understanding of the labour market e⁄ects of international mi-
gration. Note that foreign workers may be complementary to local natives in
the destination areas (see Gavosto, Venturini, Villosio, 1999; Venturini, Vil-
losio 2006, for evidence), but compete with potential native migrants from
other areas of the country.
An interesting point in this context is that Barba, Bertola and Sem-
benelli (2006) ￿nd that ￿rms that hire migrants have a lower rate of direct
investment abroad, while much higher foreign direct investment shares are
found for ￿rms which do not hire foreign workers (in fact, the opening of the
East European countries has created new incentives for international cap-
ital movements, lowering those for decentralizing to South Italy). Hence,
foreign immigrants complement local native workers rather than to replace
them. Thus, foreign immigrants are far from ￿ stealing natives￿jobs￿ , instead
they help keeping investment and production activities in the immigration
areas. However, the picture looks less favourable if we consider the im-
pact on regional imbalances in the destination countries: The immigration
of foreigners can aggravate internal imbalances both by reducing domestic
migration from the poorer to the more prosperous regions as well as by
reducing investment from rich to poor regions.
Altogether, our ￿ndings suggest that the area approach to assess the
labour market impact of international migration might by by ill-suited if we
do not consider other currents which equilibrate the e⁄ects of immigration
across regions. One of these channels is the replacement of domestic migra-
tion from poor to rich regions through the immigration of foreigners. Our
24analysis suggests that the impact of foreign immigration on domestic migra-
tion is far from irrelevant in the Italian case. To examine the implications
for labour markets is an important issue for future research.
6 Appendix Data Sources and de￿nitions
Native Immigrants
Data on in internal migration ￿ ows are collected by Istat (the national
statistical agency) from the local Registrars￿O¢ ces. Since Italian residents
are required by law to register in the place where they live (and, further,
actually need to in order to have full access to the national health services
and other bene￿ts) these data are likely to represent accurately, even if not
very timely, migration ￿ ows. Data for male migrants (primary workers)
are used as a dependent variable, and for male and female ￿ ows in the
construction of the proxy for the chain variable.
Wages
Regional series for the annual wage rate are derived from the WHIP
(Work Histories Italian Panel) archive based upon social security data. The
annual wage is de￿ned as the total amount of the earnings received monthly
by the employees (basic wage, cost-of-living allowance, residual fees, over-
time payments), plus the total amount of the non-monthly wage (back pay,
bonuses, supplements holiday pay, sick pay). It is the reference values used
to calculate social security and insurance contributions paid by the ￿rm, the
social security burden of the employee and, if applicable, tax relief applied to
employment. Therefore, this represents the annual compensation received
by the employee net of the social security and health bene￿t contributions
paid by the ￿rm, but gross of those due by the employee.
Unemployment Rate and Labour Force
Both included in the standard labour force survey data published by
Istat.
Foreign Immigrants
Regional data on residence permits issued are collected by the Ministry
of the Interior and revised by Istat. A serious problem of these series is the
failure to exclude expired permits until 1991, which causes (i) a growing,
positive bias up to that year, and (ii), a strong negative structural break in
1992. To obtain a series representing more accurately the actual number of
foreign workers present in the local labour markets we decided to smooth the
observations for the period 1985-1995 using a kernel regression on a linear
time trend.
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